

The National and Regional Macroeconomic Effects of Transportation Policies in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act

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ABSTRACT

We use a dynamic eight-region model (REMI TranSight) to evaluate the overall economic effects of the Department of Transportation components of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). We show the respective macroeconomic impacts on these eight regions for seven major programs: highway infrastructure investment; public transit; Amtrak; high-speed rail; aviation; shipyards and merchant marine; and discretionary funding. The macroeconomic benefits of these initiatives are primarily realized as short-term job creation.

However, our program-level simulations allow us to compare macroeconomic outcomes for projects with differing rates of return, observed as changes in transportation costs for final goods, commuting costs, and access costs for factors of production and intermediate inputs. We find that long-term effects are highly responsive to these dynamic network changes, introducing significant policy implications. Given more detailed travel demand and consumer behavior data, state and local governments and Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs) can use dynamic macroeconomic models to estimate the long-term benefits of potential projects, realized as efficiency and transportation cost savings. Thus informed, policymakers will be able to distinguish between “bridges to nowhere” and “bridges to somewhere” and subsequently invest their stimulus dollars in projects that will yield the greatest long-run benefits, minimizing wasteful spending.

1 INTRODUCTION

2 In response to the greatest economic crisis since the Great Depression, President Obama signed
3 the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act (ARRA) on February 17, 2009. The objectives of
4 the stimulus package are twofold: to stimulate output and increase employment in the short-term,
5 and to invest in long-term projects that are crucial for sustained economic prosperity. In this
6 analysis, we utilize the REMI TranSight model to evaluate the Department of Transportation
7 components of the ARRA, totaling \$48.1 billion, through 2030. This model allows our study to
8 show the total economic effects of infrastructure spending, including a dynamic component that
9 incorporates increases in labor and factor mobility and decreases in transportation, access, and
10 commuting costs. Policymakers would be wise to make use of such modeling; by evaluating and
11 comparing the economic impacts of different projects, local governments, state Departments of
12 Transportation, and Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPO's) can steer their stimulus
13 dollars to the most productive projects, bypassing those with minimal long-term macroeconomic
14 benefits.

15 Many of the long-term effects of the transportation initiatives appear as the
16 aforementioned changes in mobility and costs. The immediate response, however, is that of a
17 traditional Keynesian stimulus, designed to increase employment over the baseline forecast for
18 the next two to three years. The Federal Open Market Committee has held the target federal
19 funds rate at 0-0.25% since their December 18, 2008 meeting (1) and traditional monetary policy
20 is thus insufficient to foster economic recovery. In our analysis we assume a Keynesian policy
21 model in which monetary policy is constant. Our findings are presented as the differences
22 relative to REMI's standard baseline forecast, which is estimated based on historical trends, the
23 REMI model's underlying equations, and a macroeconomic forecast acquired in October 2008
24 from the University of Michigan's Research Seminar on Quantitative Economics.

25 With this aggregate study, we evaluate three separate dimensions of these transportation
26 initiatives: 1) the temporal effect; 2) geographical effects and their variations; and 3) the
27 respective impacts of the various scenarios. Since project-level data is often unavailable, many of
28 our simulations required us to make significant assumptions. Despite the administration's
29 emphasis on "shovel-ready" projects, only \$20.5 billion (42% of the total transportation
30 component of the ARRA) has been allocated at the time of publication, and less than \$500
31 million has been paid out thus far (2). These projects should be evaluated more rigorously upon
32 the release of more precise data.


34 Temporal Effects

35 As shown in Figure 1, the immediate effect of the disbursement of stimulus dollars is a rapid
36 increase in employment over the baseline forecast, peaking in 2010. Employment drops quickly
37 thereafter, and the stimulus effect is largely exhausted within four years. In 2014 employment
38 actually drops below the baseline and then gradually increases, reaching the baseline by 2030.
39 This is contrary to our expectation that efficiency gains from the transportation projects would
40 result in employment remaining above the baseline in the long term. Although the transportation
41 component of the ARRA increases employment during the recession by roughly 375 thousand
42 jobs nationwide, the dynamic impact is insufficient to offset the "flooding" of the labor market
43 by construction workers and employees in intermediate demand industries upon completion of
44 the intensive construction phase of the projects. This observation that employment does not
45 significantly increase above the baseline forecast in the long run has substantial policy
46 implications. The REMI forecast assumes that the economy begins to improve in 2010,

1 evidenced by increasing employment and GDP; however, the lackluster long-term effects imply
 2 that if the economy does not improve, a second stimulus may indeed be needed to stimulate
 3 growth.

4 There are several possible explanations for this development. In the first place, many of
 5 the initiatives will render concrete benefits that are not readily modeled. For example, Amtrak
 6 improvements and the Federal Aviation Administration's programs provide the funding for
 7 construction projects that will result in taxpayer cost savings from improved safety, logistics, and
 8 maintenance; however, such savings are difficult to quantify and model. Secondly, some of the
 9 likely efficiency gains, such as those from transit initiatives, were not modeled due to insufficient
 10 data. Lastly, long-term programs such as high-speed rail are unlikely to provide significant
 11 efficiency gains during the time frame of our analysis.


12 It is important to emphasize that the drop in employment change below zero, observed
 13 beginning in 2014, is a fall below the baseline forecast and not an absolute decrease in
 14 employment. The REMI forecast assumes that total employment increases at least 0.5% yearly
 15 from 2011, and increases more than 0.8% by 2030.
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17 FIGURE 1 Change in Total Employment from the Baseline Forecast, All Transportation Programs
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20 Geographic Effects

21 Figure 2 on the next page shows the percentage change in unemployment in 2010, the peak year,
 22 over the baseline forecast incorporated into the REMI model. The model configuration used for
 23 our simulations groups the states into the following eight regions: New England, Mideast, Great
 24 Lakes, Plains, Southeast, Southwest, Rocky Mountain, and Far West.
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This data shows that the Far West, Plains, and Rocky Mountain Regions experienced the highest rates of growth and the Mideast region the lowest; the Northeast, Great Lakes, Southeast, and Southwest regions experienced marginally differing rates of growth. Some of these differences can be explained by differences in the inputs. For example, the Southeast, Great Lakes, Plains, and Far West regions are modeled as receiving funds for high-speed rail programs, while the Northeast, Mideast, Southwest, and Rocky Mountain regions are not. However, much of the changes reflected the differing economic bases in the regions; for example, although the Plains region was third from the bottom in expenditure within the region, it had one of the highest percentage increases in jobs caused by intermediate demand and investment demand. Also, the Northeast and Mideast regions may have seen such small increases because their economies are heavily service-based.

Program Summary

The eleven transportation initiatives of the stimulus package fall under the following major categories: Highway infrastructure (\$27.5 billion), public transit (\$8.4 billion), Amtrak (\$1.3 billion), high-speed rail (\$8 billion, with an additional \$5 billion in the federal budget for the next five years), aviation (\$1.3 billion), shipyards/merchant marine (\$100 million, although the amount of money actually spent is larger because the federal share for this program is only 75%), and discretionary funding (\$1.5 billion) (3). Note that the expenditure in Table 1 is not always equal to that stated by the DOT because we have excluded internal administrative costs and projects in US territories from our simulations. In addition, the three-year multipliers in the table below are not always the same as we would see by dividing the three-year cumulative effect by the total expenditure for the program; some program expenditures are allocated over more than three years, and we only count the expenditure and output gains within those three years when calculating the three-year multipliers.

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Program	Stimulus (\$, billions)	Cumulative Effect After Third Year	Cumulative Effect After Tenth Year	GDP Multiplier – 3 Year	GDP Multiplier – 10 Year
Highway Infrastructure	27.210	31.046	33.895	1.426	1.246
Public Transit	8.146	6.004	9.025	1.201	1.108
Amtrak	1.294	1.686	1.414	1.303	1.093
High-Speed Rail	13.000	9.112	17.287	1.425	1.330
Aviation	1.267	1.785	1.506	1.409	1.189
Shipyards/ Merchant Marine	0.131	0.154	0.134	1.179	1.026
Discretionary Funding	1.500	1.977	1.693	1.318	1.129

2 TABLE 1 Summary Statistics for all programs

3

4 **HIGHWAY INFRASTRUCTURE**

5 Of the \$27.5 billion allocated to highway infrastructure spending, \$26.66 billion was allocated
6 directly to the states for “shovel-ready” highway projects, with preference given to those that can
7 be completed within three years (4). An additional \$550 million was stipulated for highway
8 projects on federal lands (4). \$310 million of these funds are to be spent on Indian Reservation
9 Roads, with the remaining \$240 million for Park Roads and Parkways, Forest Highways, and
10 Refuge Roads (4). The rest of the funds administered by the Federal Highway Administration,
11 totaling \$290 million, are allocated to projects in U.S. territories (with a small amount set aside
12 for administrative costs) (4) and are excluded from our simulations. Thus, the total spending
13 modeled is \$27.21 billion.

14

15 **Methodology**

16 The immediate disbursement of the highway funds was modeled as an increased demand for
17 highway construction. The Federal Highway Administration has released state- and urban area-
18 level data on the direct apportionment of funds to state Departments of Transportation (4). The
19 \$310 million for Indian Reservation Roads was split equally among the Far West, Rocky
20 Mountain, Southwest, and Plains regions (the regions with the majority of, and largest, Indian
21 reservations (5)), while the remaining \$240 million for park roads was allocated among all eight
22 regions, weighted by the percentage of other funds allocated to the region. Given the timeframe
23 for the project-specific allocation of funds (June 2009 - September 2010) and the stated
24 preference for projects to be completed within three years (4) (as well as the lag between
25 disbursement and construction), 20% of the funding was allocated in 2009, 30% in both 2010
26 and 2011, and 20% in 2012.

27 The TranSight transportation cost matrix is the interface for modeling cost savings and
28 changes in “effective distance” due to improvements in the transportation network. This feature
29 includes separate matrices for transportation costs, accessibility costs, and commuting costs (see
30 descriptions given in the above summary of the highway infrastructure components). The default
31 values for these three costs between and within all regions are 1; thus, any cost savings are
32 modeled as a value less than 1, while any cost increase results in an input greater than 1.

1 To calculate the transportation cost savings, we assumed a return of 5% on our
 2 investment, less the \$550 million apportioned for Indian Reservations and Federal Lands (as
 3 these are more likely to be used for recreational and personal use than in transporting goods and
 4 services). We multiplied our expenditure, \$27.21 billion, by 5%, resulting in a total cost savings
 5 of \$1.3605 billion. This number was divided by the total output of trucking (derived from the
 6 baseline forecast) for each year from 2009 until 2030, giving us the percentage decrease in
 7 transportation cost for each year. This percentage decrease was subtracted from the baseline
 8 value of 1 within the model's transportation cost matrix to calculate the new effective distance.
 9 For the sake of simplicity, the transportation cost savings were assumed to be equal within and
 10 between all regions. The accessibility cost savings were assumed to be equal to half of the
 11 transportation cost savings, with the commuting cost savings equal to 10% of the transportation
 12 cost savings. Commuting cost savings are only applied within regions, as most commutes do not
 13 transcend regions.

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Results

All Regions

Category	Units	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	Annual Avg (Through 2030)
Total Employment	Thousands (Jobs)	134.438	203.531	202.281	133.547	-1.859	24.759
Total GDP	Billions of Fixed (2000) Dollars	7.547	11.651	11.848	8.016	-0.057	1.345
Real Disposable Personal Income	Billions of Fixed (2000) Dollars	4.018	5.934	5.886	3.852	-0.361	0.696

17 TABLE 2 Summary Statistics for Highway Infrastructure, 5% return on investment

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The immediate impact of the direct spending on road construction results in more than 200,000 jobs saved or created above the baseline forecast; however, the dynamic results are less impressive. Once all money is disbursed in 2012, total employment actually drops below the baseline and remains there for the duration of the study. It increases gradually but, in 2030, total employment for the country as a whole remains 500 jobs below the baseline. This is certainly a very small decrease, trivial in comparison to the forecasted employment growth.

In order to illustrate the importance of project selection in maximizing the return on investment, we ran simulations with identical construction inputs and a 10% return on investment. Table 3 reports the outputs from this simulation and the percentage changes from the 5% simulation.

All Regions

Category	Units	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	Annual Avg (Through 2030)
Total Employment	Thousands (Jobs)	134.578	203.813	202.734	134.094	-1.172	25.450
Total GDP	Billions of Fixed (2000) Dollars	7.559	11.675	11.889	8.067	0.009	1.434
Real Disposable Personal Income	Billions of Fixed (2000) Dollars	4.038	5.966	5.932	3.904	-0.292	0.768
Total Employment - % Change from 5%	Thousands (Jobs)	0.104%	0.139%	0.224%	0.410%	36.955%	2.788%
Total GDP - % Change from 5%	Billions of Fixed (2000) Dollars	0.159%	0.206%	0.346%	0.636%	115.789%	6.638%
Real Disposable Personal Income - % Change from 5%	Billions of Fixed (2000) Dollars	0.498%	0.539%	0.782%	1.350%	19.114%	10.242%

TABLE 3 Summary Statistics for Highway Infrastructure, 10% return on investment

Although we still observe a drop in employment below the baseline forecast, this drop is significantly smaller than in our first simulation; in addition, GDP remains above the baseline in 2013, delaying the drop in output by one year. Because the construction inputs were identical to those in the 5% simulation, these significant benefits are thus solely due to the dynamic network and transportation cost benefits. Given detailed localized travel demand data, state and local policymakers can calculate project-specific transportation cost changes and apply this method of analysis to allocate their stimulus funding to the most useful projects with the greatest macroeconomic impacts, thus avoiding wasteful spending on projects that do not yield significant benefits.

Because the employment effect of highway spending is very responsive to direct expenditure, the regions with the highest expenditure (Southeast, Far West, and Great lakes) see the highest absolute increase in employment, while those with the lowest expenditure (New England, Rocky Mountain, and Plains) see the lowest absolute increases. The percentage change increases in the peak year, however, are more mixed, ranging from 0.9% in the Mideast region to 0.15% in the Rocky Mountain region.

PUBLIC TRANSIT

Public transit is a particularly attractive component of our transportation infrastructure because it improves the mobility (and thus employment opportunities) of those who cannot afford cars, reduces traffic congestion, and reduces greenhouse gas emissions and demand for oil. The ARRA contains \$8.4 billion in total funding to be administered by the Federal Transit Administration, spread among three separate programs (6). The allocation for Transit Capital Assistance is \$6.9 billion, to be used for planning, engineering, and design of transit projects and capital investments in buses and security equipment (6). Fixed Guideway Infrastructure Investment (FGII) and Capital Investment Grants/New Starts each receive \$750 million (6). FGII funds may be used for any project that involves the construction, maintenance, or improvement of a fixed guideway transit system, while the New Starts program supports similar initiatives whose construction is already underway (7).

1 Methodology

2 Lacking project-specific data (the information provided by the FTA is only state- and program-
 3 level specific) (8), our modeling of the public transit initiatives of the ARRA has required us to
 4 make some significant assumptions. For Transit Capital Assistance, 80% was allocated to
 5 investment and 20% to construction; construction spending is defined as the erecting and repair
 6 of new buildings and infrastructure, while investment is the purchase of final goods (buses,
 7 trains, safety equipment, etc.) that are incorporated into these projects. The FTA stipulates that
 8 50% of funds are to be obligated by September 2009, with the rest by March 2010 (7); funds are
 9 required to be disbursed by September of 2015 (7). Thus, we assume that 10% of funds are spent
 10 in 2009, 20% in 2010, 30% in 2011, 20% in 2012, 10% in 2013, and 5% each in 2014 and 2015.
 11 Fixed Guideway Infrastructure Investment is modeled as 30% investment and 70% construction.
 12 Again, funds are to be disbursed by September 2015 (7), and we model the spending according
 13 to the following distribution: 5% in 2009, 10% in 2010, 20% in 2011, 30% in 2012, 20% in
 14 2013, 10% in 2014, and 5% in 2015. Lastly, New Starts are also modeled as 30% investment and
 15 70% construction and, as funds are to be disbursed by 2010 for projects already underway (7),
 16 funds are allocated equally between 2009 and 2010.

17

All Regions

Category	Units	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	Annual Avg (Through 2030)
Total Employment	Thousands (Jobs)	19.156	31.359	35.484	25.969	13.125	4.991
Total GDP	Billions of Fixed (2000) Dollars	1.258	2.159	2.587	1.934	1.012	0.356
Real Disposable Personal Income	Billions of Fixed (2000) Dollars	0.605	0.973	1.107	0.801	0.393	0.144

18 TABLE 4 Summary Statistics for Public Transit

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20 Much like the results for our highway infrastructure analysis, the regions that received the
 21 most funding (Mideast, Far West, Southwest, and Great Lakes) saw the largest absolute changes
 22 in employment above the baseline, with the Mideast seeing an employment increase of 7500 in
 23 the peak year of 2011; on the other hand, the Plains region saw the smallest increase at just under
 24 2000. The relative changes, on the other hand, are not as easily predicted. The Northeast region,
 25 which ranked 6th in funds allocated and 7th in total employment increase, had the highest percent
 26 increase in employment (followed closely by the Mideast); total percentage changes ranged from
 27 over 0.025% in these regions to less than 0.015% in the Plains.

28

29 HIGH-SPEED RAIL

30 Despite our status as the world's leading economic and technological power, America lacks a
 31 comprehensive high-speed railway system. The ARRA includes a "down payment" on such a
 32 system by funding the early stages of development. Accordingly, we model the early-stage
 33 planning and construction but no efficiency changes or cost savings.

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1 Methodology

2 There are ten potential corridors identified in the strategic plan for high speed rail (9). We
 3 selected four corridors that are most likely to receive the \$8 billion federal funding, which is
 4 awarded on a competitive basis; our selections are based on the criteria set forth by the High
 5 Speed Intercity Passenger Rail (HSIPR) Guidance published in June (10). The four chosen
 6 corridors are: California Corridor, Pacific Northwest Corridor, Chicago Hub Network, and
 7 Florida Corridor. Although there are four different funding tracks, only Track 1 and Track 2 are
 8 included in this simulation because Tracks 3 and 4 are not funded by the ARRA. Track 1 is
 9 aimed at providing support for “ready-to-go” projects and the money can be used toward
 10 construction such as infrastructure, facilities, and equipments; Track 2 is intended to fund the
 11 development of entire segments or phases of corridor programs and the projects do not
 12 necessarily need to be “ready-to-go” (10). In addition, President Obama has submitted a budget
 13 request for an additional \$5 billion for the next five years in high speed rail investment.

14 We assume that more than half of the total \$13 billion will be spent within the next three
 15 years because Track 1 has a project completion deadline of September 30, 2012; thus, our
 16 assumption is that 70% of funding will be directed to Track 1. Track 2, to which we allocate the
 17 remaining 30% of funds, has a project completion deadline of September 30, 2017. The Far West
 18 region is the main recipient of the federal funding since it includes both the California and
 19 Pacific Northwest Corridors. The Chicago Hub Network is spread throughout the Great Lakes,
 20 Plains, and Southeast regions. The Florida Corridor will provide funding to the Southeast region.
 21 Northeast, Mideast, Southwest, and Rocky Mountain regions do not receive any funding. We
 22 assumed that for both tracks, 70% of the funding will be directed toward construction, 25% will
 23 be used for professional and technical services (i.e. planning), and the remaining 5% will be
 24 allocated for investment (producers’ durable equipment).

25 The Chicago Hub Network is the most extensive and complex high speed rail project
 26 within the selection (9), so it was allocated 37.5% of the original \$8 billion. California and the
 27 Pacific Northwest Corridors are each awarded 25% of the funding, while Florida receives the last
 28 12.5% because it is the shortest project out of the four. We assume that the additional \$5 billion
 29 will be distributed evenly among the four corridors in five years.

30

31 Results

All Regions

Category	Units	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	Annual Avg (Through 2030)
Total Employment	Thousands (Jobs)	15.047	65.281	65.406	66.547	30.016	10.854
Total GDP	Billions of Fixed (2000) Dollars	0.922	4.036	4.154	4.332	1.985	0.666
Real Disposable Personal Income	Billions of Fixed (2000) Dollars	0.469	2.000	1.963	2.047	0.855	0.315

32 TABLE 5 Summary Statistics for High-Speed Rail

33

34 The high-speed rail program has the largest multiplier among all initiatives modeled in
 35 our simulations. Because of its longer time horizon, it will keep construction workers, engineers,
 36 and planners employed for longer and encounters the drop in employment and output below the
 37 baseline much later than other programs. In the long-term, the development of a sophisticated

1 high-speed railway system is likely to result in a decrease in demand for fuel and air travel for
 2 long-distance trips, as people who were previously forced to drive would be able to take the
 3 more economical and environmentally-friendly train for long-distance trips.

4 Once again, regions receiving the most funding see the greatest increase in employment,
 5 with the Far West receiving a net gain of 23,000 jobs in the peak year of 2012. The Great Lakes
 6 benefits by nearly 14,000 jobs, the Southeast by over 13,000 jobs, and employment in the Plains
 7 is nearly 8,000 above the baseline. In addition, this component allows us to examine the
 8 economic interactions between the different regions in this national model. Even the regions that
 9 do not receive funding for high-speed railway projects (Northeast, Mideast, Southwest, and
 10 Rocky Mountain) see employment increase by 1-3 thousand due to increased demand for
 11 intermediate inputs and professional and technical services produced within the region.

12 Further study is needed as this network develops and more project-specific construction
 13 data (as well as information on consumer and traveler behavior) are available, allowing us to
 14 improve on our significant assumptions about the geographical distribution of funds and include
 15 the dynamic effects of changes in consumer behavior.

17 **AMTRAK**

18 The Federal Railroad Administration has also been charged with allocating \$1.3 billion to
 19 improve America's largest existing passenger rail network, the National Railroad Passenger
 20 Corporation (Amtrak). Amtrak is required to spend \$850 million to rebuild and modernize
 21 infrastructure and equipment, with the remaining \$450 million to be allocated specifically for
 22 projects to upgrade security and life safety systems (11). After evaluating a list of potential
 23 projects totaling over \$20 billion, Amtrak has chosen to fund \$1.294 billion worth of projects
 24 (12).

26 **Methodology**

27 Amtrak provides a detailed project summary that includes the time frame and funding allocated
 28 for each project (12). All projects are expected to be completed by February 17, 2011. Some of
 29 the money is given to specific Amtrak stations for upgrades and repairs and some is distributed
 30 to specific regions for general upgrades and replacements. We determined the amount of funding
 31 allocated for each region and assumed that 80% will be used for construction projects, with the
 32 remaining 20% going toward investment. Because of the nature of the projects, i.e. mainly
 33 security and station improvements, we do not model any transportation, efficiency or cost
 34 savings. Based on Amtrak's project-specific data, roughly 13% of the funds will be spent in
 35 2009, 60% in 2010, and the remaining 27% in 2011.

37 **Results**

Category	Units	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	Annual Avg (Through 2030)
Total Employment	Thousands (Jobs)	3.563	16.563	7.375	-0.078	-0.391	0.953
Total GDP	Billions of Fixed (2000) Dollars	0.211	1.011	0.464	-0.001	-0.025	0.055
Real Disposable Personal Income	Billions of Fixed (2000) Dollars	0.107	0.504	0.197	-0.025	-0.022	0.018

38 TABLE 6 Summary Statistics for Amtrak

1 Following the pattern evident in our simulations thus far, the ten-year multiplier for the Amtrak
2 component is lower than the three-year multiplier. Output and employment drop below the
3 baseline as the regional economies “unwind” following the completion of construction and
4 investment expenditures, although it is again important to remember that this decrease is relative
5 to a national employment increase of over 0.8% in 2012 (1.5 million jobs). The Northeast and
6 Mideast regions receive the most funding and thus see the largest increases in employment and
7 GDP growth above the baseline; this is unsurprising considering the predominance of the
8 Northeast Corridor (NEC) running between Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore and
9 Washington within the Amtrak network as a whole (in terms of ridership and total service
10 frequency).

11

12 **AVIATION**

13 The ARRA stipulates that \$1.3 billion is to be set aside for improvements to America’s aviation
14 facilities and infrastructure. These initiatives do not comprise a drastic structural realignment of
15 our aviation system. Instead, they provide the necessary capital for much-needed upgrades and
16 new construction to assure the continued functioning of the backbone of air travel in the United
17 States: airports themselves and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)-controlled navigation,
18 radar, and air traffic control facilities.

19

20 **Methodology**

21 Of the \$1.3 billion in recovery funds administered by the Federal Aviation Administration
22 (FAA), \$200 million is to be appropriated within the FAA’s existing Facilities and Equipment
23 (F&E) program, which finances capital projects and modernization efforts for the FAA’s air
24 traffic control, navigation, and airway facilities and systems. The FAA has released project-
25 specific data for the F&E program: \$50 million is used to upgrade power systems, another \$50
26 million for air route traffic control centers, \$80 million for air traffic control towers and radar
27 facilities, and \$20 million for navigation and landing equipment (13). Power system upgrades
28 were modeled as investment spending (producers’ durable equipment), while the combined \$180
29 million for navigation and landing equipment, air traffic control towers and air route traffic
30 control centers are exclusively construction projects. The FAA has released data on the
31 individual cost of each project, as well as the agency-wide expenditure per year for each program
32 (14) with all expenditure occurring in 2009 and 2010; the expenditure for each project in a given
33 year is weighted by the percentage of total program expenditure for that year.

34 The remaining \$1.1 billion is disbursed through the ARRA-specific Grants-in-Aid for
35 Airports program. Excluding funds appropriated for U.S. territories, the total amount disbursed is
36 \$1,067,548,630 (15). Grants-in-Aid projects are modeled exclusively as construction
37 expenditure. While total state expenditure data is available (15), the temporal allocation is not;
38 thus, the expenditure is divided equally between 2009 and 2010.

Results

All Regions

Category	Units	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	Annual Avg (Through 2030)
Total Employment	Thousands (Jobs)	13.297	15.953	0.438	-0.031	-0.484	1.074
Total GDP	Billions of Fixed (2000) Dollars	\$0.786	\$0.966	\$0.033	\$0.000	-\$0.032	\$0.062
Real Disposable Personal Income	Billions of Fixed (2000) Dollars	\$0.404	\$0.470	-\$0.012	-\$0.003	-\$0.016	\$0.034

1 TABLE 7 Summary Statistics for Aviation

2 Because of the predominance of construction and other “one-time” expenditures without
 3 any apparent direct cost or efficiency savings, employment increases by nearly 16,000 jobs over
 4 the baseline. Employment peaks in 2010 and again drops shortly thereafter, actually falling
 5 below the baseline by 2012 and not reaching the baseline forecast by 2029. Once again, the total
 6 regional increase in jobs for each region corresponds closely to the raw expenditure on these
 7 programs.

8 SHIPYARDS/MERCHANT MARINE

9 The \$100 million administered by the Maritime Administration (MARAD) for “Supplemental
 10 Grants for Assistance to Small Shipyards” is intended for capital and infrastructure
 11 improvements to encourage greater efficiency, quality, and competition within the shipbuilding
 12 industry. (16).

15 Methodologies

16 MARAD received over 500 applications, requesting a combined \$1.25 billion, and project-
 17 specific allocations do not need to be released until August 17, 2009. Of the \$100 million
 18 allocated, \$2 million is reserved for program administration, so only \$98 million is modeled (16).
 19 Unlike the other programs within the stimulus package, these funds are not allocated with a
 20 100% federal share; instead, the federal government covers a maximum of 75% of each project
 21 (16). Therefore, to determine the total amount spent on shipyard projects, we multiplied \$98
 22 million by 1.34, determining that \$130.67 is to be allocated. Because the remaining 25% is paid
 23 by the private shipyards themselves instead of the state or local government (16), we do not
 24 model any reallocation of government spending. Project-specific data is not available; thus,
 25 funds are disbursed by region weighted by the number of existing shipyards in the region, as
 26 determined by the Economic Census of 2002 (17). We model 70% of the spending as investment
 27 and 30% as demand for construction. Because the deadline for MARAD to announce accepted
 28 applications is August 17th, 2009, we assume that only 20% of the funds will be disbursed in
 29 2009, with 50% in 2010 and the remaining 30% in 2011.

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1 **Results**

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3 **All Regions**

Category	Units	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	Annual Avg (Through 2030)
Total Employment	Thousands (Jobs)	0.438	1.141	0.703	0.016	-0.016	0.091
Total GDP	Billions of Fixed (2000) Dollars	0.028	0.078	0.048	0.002	-0.001	0.006
Real Disposable Personal Income	Billions of Fixed (2000) Dollars	0.014	0.035	0.019	-0.002	-0.004	-0.003
Population	Thousands	-0.031	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.031	-0.001

4 TABLE 8 Summary Statistics for Small Shipyards

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6 Due to its small size, the overall economic impact of the Small Shipyards program is relatively
7 weak. In total, it is expected to create just over 1100 jobs in its peak year of 2010. Total
8 employment again drops below the baseline by 2012 (although the decrease is very small).
9 Benefits are unsurprisingly concentrated in areas with substantial access to water and maritime
10 shipping lanes, as these areas have the most shipyards and receive the most funding. The
11 Southeast, Far West, Great Lakes, Mideast, New England and Southwest regions benefitted,
12 while the landlocked Plains and Rocky Mountain regions saw miniscule predicted employment
13 increases.

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15 **TOTAL**

16 The previous simulations were all run simultaneously to estimate the total impact of the
17 transportation component of the stimulus package on the US economy. The remaining \$1.5
18 billion stipulated for Transportation Investment Generating Economic Recovery (TIGER)
19 Discretionary Grants, providing funding for assorted multimodal surface projects, has been
20 included in this simulation. Because such funds will be disbursed through many agencies,
21 TIGER Grants do not comprise a coherent standalone program. Awarding of these grants will be
22 determined directly by the Office of the Secretary of Transportation and funds are to be allocated
23 especially to high-impact projects that will result in specific transportation benefits while rapidly
24 increasing employment, particularly in economically distressed areas. Much like our above study
25 of the Supplemental Grants for Assistance to Small Shipyards, the current uncertainty
26 surrounding the allocation of these funds has required us to make significant assumptions in our
27 modeling of these funds. The per-region allocation is weighted by all other existing funding, with
28 70 percent modeled as construction and the remaining 30 percent as investment. Given that
29 funding will be announced in late 2009 at the earliest, the temporal distribution of the spending is
30 as follows: 10% in 2009, 55% in 2010, 35% in 2011.

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All Regions

Category	Units	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	Annual Avg (Through 2030)
Total Employment	Thousands (Jobs)	198.625	352.844	330.469	234.047	42.594	25.6408
Total GDP	Billions of Fixed (2000) Dollars	11.507	21.008	20.251	14.73	2.997	1.496
Real Disposable Personal Income	Billions of Fixed (2000) Dollars	6.014	10.517	9.753	6.917	0.882	0.8038
Population	Thousands	-0.031	0.031	0.063	0.063	0.063	0.2694

TABLE 9 Summary Statistics for All Programs

As is to be expected considering the results of our previous individual simulations, the employment effect of all transportation components is highly responsive to the magnitude of funds allocated. By 2015, when the construction and funding phases of almost all programs are complete, total employment in the US economy dips below the baseline. Employment remains a relatively minor 1000 jobs below the baseline in 2030, the final year of our simulation.

CONCLUSION

In structuring the ARRA, Congress and the Obama Administration aimed to fund projects that will provide jobs in the short term while yielding long-term benefits. Our analysis shows that the construction-heavy Department of Transportation initiatives are heavily biased towards short-term job creation, in contrast to our previous research that has shown substantial long-term economic benefits of the Department of Energy components of the ARRA.

There are several possible reasons for this surprising result. In the first place, the broad scope of our study has required us to make significant assumptions regarding the long-term cost savings and efficiency gains and, in the case of mass transit, possible savings in the future have not been modeled. Secondly, while high-speed rail projects are likely to result in significant savings and efficiency improvements, these dynamic components are unlikely to be realized within the twenty-one year timeframe of our study. Third, the \$48.1 billion, while a significant sum, is a relatively small investment in America's massive transportation infrastructure. Lastly, a large proportion of the projects funded, such as security upgrades for Amtrak or a refurbished air traffic control center, may be necessary but are unlikely to result in substantial cost or efficiency changes.

Most importantly, this analysis exhibits the advantages of comprehensive macroeconomic modeling in the selection and implementation of transportation projects, allowing policymakers to determine the most beneficial projects before they are implemented and thus minimize waste.

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