# Economics of a Carbon Tax: 3 Studies Compared

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# Who am I?

Program Manager, Center for Climate Strategies (www.climatestrategies.us)

- Subnational/International Climate Policy Analyst ~10 years
  - ▶ USAID, NREL
  - State Climate Action Plans (KY, NY, PA, MD, MN)
- REMI Journeyman
  - Southern California (SCAG) Long-range Transportation Plan
  - Oregon and Washington Low-Carbon Fuel Standard
    - Detailed Supply Scenarios
  - PA Climate Action Plan 2015 Update 12 policies, energy efficiency
  - Minnesota CSEO (climate action planning) 20 policies, multiple sectors
  - DC Carbon Price!



Center for Climate Strategies (<u>www.climatestrategies.us</u>)

2004 – Present

> 20+ State Climate Action Plans (KY, NY, SCAG, MD, MN most recently)

- Multi-Sector, Multi-Criteria, Custom Plans
- Stakeholder/Policy Design Process and Analysis
- Long-time REMI user

International Low-Emissions Efforts/Paris Agreement Roadmaps

- USAID Guatemala, Ukraine, Mexico
- NREL/State/UNEP West Africa, Central Africa, Capacity Building & Support

# Carbon Tax: The Central Concept

- Low, but steadily rising, price applied to carbon sources
  - Price based on emissions intensity, not per unit energy
  - Aggressive: \$25+/ton fee level, rising \$10+/ton every year
  - Milder: ~\$10/ton, rising just above inflation
- Price <u>Signal</u> crucial to design!
  - Long-term policy rising price announced over 10+ years
  - ▶ Homes and businesses: <u>Opportunity</u> to avoid and <u>Time</u> to avoid tax burden.
  - > 3 year plan-ahead  $\rightarrow$  ~30% larger response!
- Return of Revenue to Economy
  - Typically not to general revenue, or paying off a bond
  - \$\$, green investment, tax offsets or a mix?

No Cap, No Credits – Not a Cap & Trade (such as RGGI, California, Washington)

### Carbon... Tax? Fee? Price?

"It's Not a Tax, You Guys!"

-- Most carbon-tax advocates

Fee funds a dedicated purpose outside general revenue

- Rebates, Investments/spending, or Programs (green or other), or a blend
- Falling revenue over time? "Great! We're cutting emissions!"

Tax for general revenue - fiscal reform/lowering other taxes

Falling revenue over time? "Terrible! We need to fund essential programs!"

Price – either a fee or tax sets a price, and ideally a price signal

# Carbon Fee & Rebate: Intended Market Shift

- Incentive to Power Suppliers (who typically pay the fee directly):
  - Lower tax burden on clean energy sources (less tax per unit energy) more price competitive
  - Low-emissions sources offer improved competitiveness, faster ROI
- Incentive to households and businesses (who see fee reflected in bills):
  - Switch to clean sources, adopt efficiency measures & equipment

#### Potential for efficiency vs. distortion:

- Administrative simplicity vs. more complex approaches (arguable, and depending on revenue use, of course)
- Redirection of revenue driver of stimulus, investment, or tax reduction

# Carbon Fee & Rebate: Perceived Political Advantage

- Market Friendliness & Absence of Mandate
  - Attractive to those who prize regulated-party flexibility

#### Broad Appeal

- Centrist groups, Reagan Republicans, etc. in vocal support
- Bipartisan Groups (CCL, CLC, Bipartisan caucus) behind the concept
- Conservatives may seek alternative to regs (clean air, clean water)
- Liberals may seek equity from rebate, social program support

#### State-level interest

- Canadian examples influential (BC, Alberta)
- NE States: RGGI covers electricity only carbon pricing could also cover transportation or heating fuels



(L Citizens' Climate Lobby

#### 70 Climate Solutions Caucus Members

35 Republican Members 35 Democratic Members





Carlos Curbelo (R-FL-26)

Ted Deutch (D-FL-22)





Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL-27) Alan Lowenthal (D-CA-47)









### Study Summaries DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, VERMONT, AND MASSACHUSETTS

### DC Fee & Rebate

- ▶ Fee: <u>\$20/ton in 2019, increasing \$10/ton each year</u>
  - 2032: \$150/ton (the cap on the policy)
- Immediate payback of revenue:
  - 75% rebate to households
  - 20% investment
  - 5% business cost abatements
- Commitment to progressive impact lower-income households must be better off
  - Rebate weighted to low-income residents
  - Result: ~30% of population receives ~40% of the rebate funds



# What Gets Priced?

#### Electricity Emissions

- Context: DC RPS = 50% of electricity would be exempt from price by 2032
  - (Electricity getting cleaner already)
- Emissions from Gas & Other Fuels
- Transportation? No!
  - ▶ Price on motor fuels  $\rightarrow$  leakage, no GHG reductions, economic losses....
  - Alternatives: Excise tax, parking meters, parking garages
- State-level border issues:
  - Avoiding leakage: gas/diesel taxed indirectly, not at pump
  - Inter-state & tourist travel
  - Offset to business costs again, avoid leakage, keep activity local

# **Emissions Reductions**

#### Significant!

DC on track to emit 7.5M – 8M tons per year (peak early 2020s)
 DOEE Forecast: 2032 roughly equal to 2018

Scenario: DC holds at 7.5M, starts to fall 0.2M per year

- Final impact: below 6M tons in 2032
- approx. 23% reduction (Electricity & Gas)

### Economic Impacts from REMI


Jobs increase – net gain of 500+ new positions

- Top winners: construction, retail, nightlife, health care
- Sectors shedding jobs: utilities, consulting/legal/technical services

#### Net Neutral Overall Effect

- 500 more jobs: <0.06% of employment a tiny change</p>
- GDP, Incomes, Value Added, Output: <0.1% change</p>
- Incomes slightly up, prices slightly up as well
- (still some buying power gained)

# Understanding the Jobs Impact: Comparing to Baseline



# Vermont: Different Prices, Different Uses of Revenue

#### 3 cases tested:

► LOW:

- \$5/ton in first year, rising \$5/year
- Max: \$50/ton (reached in year 10)
- ► MEDIUM:
  - \$10/ton in first year, rising \$10/year
  - Max: \$100/ton (reached in year 10)
- ► HIGH:
  - \$10/ton in first year, rising \$10/year
  - Max: \$150/ton (reached in year 15)








# Partial-Economy Coverage

#### Vermont a RGGI member!

- All large electric power generation facilities covered
- Carbon price covers:
  - Transportation
  - Other Liquid fuels






Residential Natural Gas
Residential Petroleum
Commercial Natural Gas
Commercial Petroleum
Industrial Natural Gas
Industrial Petroleum
Motor Gasoline
Motor Diesel
Other Transportation

### Revenue Return: It's Complicated

- Goal: Each sector (household, gov, commercial, industrial) gets back about what it contributes
- No "Redistribution" a 45/45/10 split

#### **Revenue Recycling**



Individual Rebate Credits
Low-Income Supplement
Corporate Income Tax Cuts
Employment-Based Rebate
C&I Heating and Process
Vehicle Electrification
Vehicle Hybridization
Solar Tax Credits
Market Rate Weatherization
Low-Income Weatherization

# Economic Impacts: Similar in Scale to DC

- "Low" scenario: ~1000 jobs by 2035
- "Medium": ~2000 jobs by 2035
- "High":
  - ~2750 jobs by 2035 (<0.5% of baseline employment)</p>
    - DC: 500+ jobs (still <0.2% above baseline)</p>
  - GSP: Also 0.2% to 0.5% growth (DC saw <0.1% change)</p>
- Winners/Losers:
  - Like DC, Utilities lost while Real estate, health care, and restaurants saw gains
  - Unlike DC, Retail lost ground while professional/technical services grew

# Massachusetts: Blue State with a Red Idea

Like Vermont, 3 Scenarios. Unlike Vermont, far less aggressive:

- Low: Flat carbon price of \$15/ton, reached in 2<sup>nd</sup> year, never rising
- Medium: reaching \$30/ton over 4 years, never rising
- High: reaching \$45/ton over 5 years, then holding

Small tax rates still yield big impacts!

- Revenue over \$2.5B per year in high-scenario peak year
- DC/VT, with prices 3X higher, only collect \$600-700M/year at most
- Part of the Reason: Electricity is included despite RGGI
  - (Also, Massachusetts is just bigger)


# Lower Carbon Price → Lower Carbon Reductions

- \$15/ton cap (low): 3-4% emissions reduction
- \$30/ton cap (med): 6% emissions reduction
- \$45/ton cap (high): 9% emissions reduction
  - -- and only after ~20 years of waiting for full market response!
- DC: 23% emissions reduction
  - On top of aggressive clean-electricity policy and without pricing gasoline
- Vermont: 40+% emissions reduction
  - Caveat: reduction is only on non-electricity emissions (liquid/gaseous fuels)

### Economic Impacts of Tax offsets?

- Vast majority of revenue: directly reducing other taxes
- Economic gains expected!
  - Employment steadily rising over 15-20 years before gains decline
  - 4,000 new jobs from low scenario; 12,000 from high scenario
- GDP Gains: more durable at higher prices
   Low scenario: GDP gains fall fast, falling to half strength in 6 years
   Medium: gains hold for 10 years
   High: gains grow for 10 years!

ADDITIONAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (ANNUAL) TO BASELINE




# Why Such Gains?

- Most fuels are imported, with little supply chain
- Displacing fuel imports with new buying power shifts activity to sectors with larger in-state benefits
- Winners: Construction, finance, health care, retail (after an early dip), professional services
- Losers: Utilities, fuels, retail (in the early going) as buying power weakens before rebounding

## Revenue: Mostly Tax Offsets!

- First \$100M every year: investments, research
- Rest: Corporate & Personal tax reductions



## Revenue: It Doesn't Last Long

#### DC:

- Start in 2019
- Peak in 2029 Revenue falling after 11 years!
- Per-household rebate declines after 2027 only 9 years before decline
- Vermont:
  - Start in 2017
  - Peak in 2031 Revenue falling after 15 years (upon reaching price max)
  - Per-household rebates decline after peak (2031 in high scenario)
- Massachusetts:
  - No gradual price increases peak price achieved in 3-5 years
  - Lower rates (<\$50/ton) mean revenue falls more slowly but it still falls</p>
  - Slowly falling revenue == slowly falling emissions (policy goal?)

# Key commonalities:

#### Use of CTAM

- Washington State elasticity tool w/ differentiated functions for each fuel
- Emissions reductions come from price mechanism
  - No new-tech arrival, aggressive federal action or magic investment
- Tiny net changes to total economic activity
  - Jobs, GSP/GDP, Incomes all within 1% of baseline
  - But: specific winner/loser sectors vary, and can see significant changes
- Competing increases in income and price indices
- Utility Sector Pain Electricity/transpo has options, but gas/oil?
- Energy-importer states: reducing imports drives gain. Texas?

# Key Uncertainties

Elasticity – will relationships hold at large price shifts?

- 30%-50% price changes vs. baseline same response as 3-5%?
- What kind of spending required to respond to large price shifts?
  - Just some switches and light bulbs? Or full building retrofits?
  - Could be significant with significant impact on economy
  - Could delay responsiveness/"stickiness" of elastic response
- Other broad structural/economic changes (not in baseline forecast)
  - Vehicle electrification?
- Other environmental policy

DC: Green bank, building codes, solar subsidy, renewables, DERA....

# Acknowledgments

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- You all!

Thank you very much! QUESTIONS & COMMENTS (HAPPY TO DISCUSS): SWILLIAMSON@CLIMATESTRATEGIES.US

