

## Resilience in Supply Chain Transportation Networks

#### **Igor Linkov**

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Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA










This presentation does not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Government, and is only the view of the author





People
2100 Strong
61% E&S
71% of E&S with
Advanced Degrees
29% of E&S with PhD

#### **Core Competencies**

- Blast and Weapons Effects on Structures and Geo-Materials
- 3-D Mapping and Characterization
- Cold Regions Science and Engineering
- Civil and Military Engineering
- Computational Prototyping of Military Platforms
- · Coastal, River, and Environmental Engineering
- Military Installations and Infrastructure

#### **Partners**

All DoD Services

Army, Navy, Air Force, NASA, DHS, FEMA, DIA, NGA

Academia

68 EPAs with top engineering schools

Industry 172 CRADAs

International

14 international agreements with 7 countries

US Army Corps of Engineers.



#### Supply chain woes caused US auto sales to fall 8% last year



#### A Resilient Supply Chain **Starts With Full Visibility**



Sep 30, 2022, 09:45am EDT

Gartner Predicts 95% of Companies Will Have Failed to Enable E2E Resiliency in their Supply Chains by 2026.

02/01/2023 | 04:30am EST BUSINESS OPINION CLIMATE HEALTH LIFESTYLE ARTS & CULTURE n | Economy | Energy | Money | Cryptocurrencies | Property | Banking | Technology | Markets | Travel and Tourism | Start-Ups | Future | Comment

Rebuild supply chains with greater resilience and open trade, Davos panellists say

#### How leveraging connected experiences in logistics can build resilient supply chains

Advances in cloud data storage, artificial intelligence and cellular networks are all collectively driving a more connected experience in transport and logistics


















What Makes Complex
Systems
(Communities)
Susceptible to Threat?



After Linkov and Trump, 2019



Risk -- "a situation involving exposure to danger [threat]."

Security -- "the state of being free from danger or threat."

Resilience -- "the capacity to recover quickly from difficulties."


#### Don't conflate risk and resilience


'Risk' and 'resilience' are fundamentally different concepts that are often conflated. Yet maintaining the distinction is a policy necessity. Applying a risk-based approach to a problem that requires a resilience-based solution, or vice versa, can lead to investment in systems that do not produce the changes that


Igor Linkov, Benjamin D. Trump US Army Corps of Engineers, Concord, Massachusetts, USA. Jeffrey Keisler University of Massachusetts Boston, USA. igor.linkov@usace.army.mil

**Definitions by Oxford Dictionary** 

#### Crisis Management, Risk and Resilience








After 2019

**Assessment using Resilience Matrix** 



Use resilience metrics to comparatively assess the costs and benefits of different courses of action

A matrix approach to community resilience assessment: an illustrative case at Rockaway Peninsula

Cate Fox-Lent1 · Matthew E. Bates1 · Igor Linkov1

#### **Network-based Resilience Theory?**

System's critical functionality (K)

Network topology:  $nodes(\mathcal{N})$  and  $links(\mathcal{L})$ 

John K. Baker, P.E.

1st degree connection1st

Director of Operations (G-3/5/7) at U.S.Army Installation Management Command

Network *adaptive algorithms* (*C*) defining how nodes' (links') properties and parameters change with time

A set of possible damages stakeholders want the network to be resilient against (E)

After Ganin et al., 2016

$$R = f(\mathcal{N}, \mathcal{L}, \mathcal{C}, \mathbf{E})$$

#### **Poor Efficiency:**

System cannot not accommodate a large volume of commuters driving at the same time.

Traffic congestions are predictable and are typically of moderate level.






#### **Lack of Resilience:**

System cannot recover from adverse events (car accidents, natural disasters)

Traffic disruptions are not predictable and of variable scale.



Transportation Network Model + Regional Economic Models, Inc.

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Transportation Research Part D

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/trd



Lack of resilience in transportation networks: Economic implications




SCIENCE ADVANCES | RESEARCH ARTICLE

#### **NETWORK SCIENCE**

#### Resilience and efficiency in transportation networks


Alexander A. Ganin,<sup>1,2</sup> Maksim Kitsak,<sup>3</sup> Dayton Marchese,<sup>2</sup> Jeffrey M. Keisler,<sup>4</sup> Thomas Seager,<sup>5</sup> Igor Linkov<sup>2</sup>\*

#### **Transportation Network Model**



- 2) Assign travelers and routes
- 3) Calculate free flow travel times and actual travel times
- 4) Calculate normal delay
- 5) Calibrate model to data


$$\langle \Delta T \rangle = \frac{1}{N_c} \sum_{\{ij\} \in \text{all roads}} L_{ij} \ell_{ij} \left( \frac{1}{v_{ij}} - \frac{1}{v_{ij}^0} \right)$$




**Modeling Disruptions** 

Widdeling Distublis			
Case I Natural Disasters	Case II Random Disruptions	Case III Attacks Disabling Traffic Control	Case IV Attacks Locking Traffic Control
Links (Roadways) Only	Links (Roadways) and Nodes (Intersections)	Nodes (Intersections) Only	
Modeled Fractions of Affected Nodes/Links			
From 5% to 100% with the step of 5%			
Selection of Nodes/Links Affected by a Disruption			
Proportionally to Length at Random	Uniformly at Random  Deterministically by Length, Load, and Betweenness		
Disrupted Roads and/or Intersections			
Speeds reduced to 1 km/h		Speeds reduced by 50%	Half of speeds are reduced 80%, the other half is increased 20%


#### Impact of Transportation Network Disruptions on Travel Time



Resilience vs Efficiency at 5% disruption




#### Integrating REMI Model




Model structure of TranSight


## Repurpose to Study Economic Implications of Resilience (or lack thereof)




#### Impact of Efficiency-Related Delays




#### Impact of Resilience-Related Delays



#### Lack of Resilience: Impact on GDP Random Disruptions are Much More Consequential







#### **Economic Impact – Travel Sector in Georgia**

**Results** 





- 1% decrease in Commodity Access
- 1% decrease in Output for:
  - Air Transportation
  - Amusement, gambling, and recreation
  - Accommodation
  - Food services and drinking places

Commodity
Access and
Output
-1%

Commodity Access increase from resilience measures

+0.1%

#### Immediate Effect (2025) (Change from Baseline)

In the short run, the decreased Commodity Access and Output causes the following:

tuyan\_scu@163.com Change in GDP

-\$652 Million

Change in Compensation by Quintile

-0.01% to -0.56%

Change in Employment  $\downarrow$ 

-6,892 Jobs

Increase in Unemployment Rate

0.095% to 0.100%

#### Long Term Effect (2060) (Change from Baseline)

In the long run, socio-economic indicators reach their new market equilibrium and are measured in 2060

1

**Change in GDP** 

+526 Million

Change in Compensation by Industry Quintile

+0.022% to 0.061%

Change in Employment

+2,868 Jobs


Participation
Rates by Race

+0.002% to 0.024%

what does REMI say? sm

### Freight Modeling in CA


- 1. Data Connections
  - Identify Interconnections
- 2. Data Confidence
  - Derive known commodity
     flows from data




ENVIRONMENTAL LABORATORY

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#### Data Fusion and Optimization Using Al and Resilience Modeling



#### Replica Data: Connecting Entry Points, Warehousing and Consumers



#### **Presentation Overview**

- Tools:
  - Freight Volumes
  - Scenario Comparison Tool
- Problems we are addressing:
  - I. Supply Chain Resilience Quantification
  - II. Natural Disaster Risk and Resilience
  - III. Zero-Emission Refueling Station Prioritization
  - IV. Multi-Objective Equity Optimization


Supply Chain Resilience



Natural Disaster Risk and Resilience



Zero Emission Refueling Station




Multi-Objective Equity Optimization



#### Multi-Treat Natural Disaster Resilience Quantification

- Climate events will be simulated based on existing road vulnerability assessments:
  - Precipitation
  - Wildfire
  - Sea level rise
  - Storm Surge
  - Cliff Retreat
  - Earthquakes






Changing Level of Wildfire Concern |

Caltrans Climate Change Vulnerability Assessment

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Hydrogen Refueling Stations: Candidate Locations


- Identified:
  500 Candidate Census tracts which, together minimize freight diversion
- Details:
  - 500 tracts were identified based on CTC input
  - Gas and Service stations within census blocks were also identified








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## **USACE Project Reliance on Foreign-Sourced Minerals**









#### **Estimates of Foreign-Sourced Content in Capital Goods**




Item Level



System Level





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
You are viewing Ramesh Ramaswamy's screen 

✓ view Options ✓



#### Supply-and-Demand Networks - challenges

#### SDNs operate as engines for strategic surprise - many critical vulnerabilities emerge only at the system level



RSDN will explore SDN fragilities and possible mitigations – e.g., procurement policies, strategic reserves, etc.

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#### Resilience Stress Testing




#### INTEGRATED RISK/RESILIENCE STRESS TESTING 24 March 2022 578 | Nature | Vol 603 | WHO DOES "Identify the functions and failures" "Perform the stress test" "Fortify the system" INPUTS RISK RESILIENCE OUTPUTS ANALYSIS? Develop scenarios for shocks Identify critical functions Qualitative information. Policy Analysts, "Ouick win" and stresses affecting of systems and cascading 띮 component data Generalists improvements specific vulnerabilities failures $\mathbf{L}$ Assess risk of component Identify connections across Risk Assessors. System structure, System wide failure under stress scenario multiple system domains engineers, ER resilience strategy connectivity that are difficult to recover separately per domain decision analysts Advance probabilistic risk Detailed system Network science/Al Specialists, assessment across multiple **Targeted Changes** information, advanced techniques to assess failures modelers + Interventions domains/compounding data in interconnected networks threats


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#### **Vision for System Resilience**

#### Real World



#### Model




#### Operations



#### The case for value chain resilience

Igor Linkov, Savina Carluccio, Oliver Pritchard, Áine Ní Bhreasail, Stephanie Galaitsi, Joseph Sarkis and Jeffrey M. Keisler Management Research Review
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2040-8269
DOI 10.1108/MRR-08-2019-0353



## The Science and Practice of Resilience





NATO Science for Peace and Security Series - C Environmental Security

#### Resilience and Risk

Methods and Application in Environment, Cyber and Social Bomains

> Edited by Igor Linkov José Manuel Palma-Oliveira








#### COVID-19: Systemic Risk and Resilience





# System Affected by Threats: Taxonomy


No. 0, 2020 DOI: 10.1111/risa.13577

The Need to Reconcile Concepts that Characterize Systems Facing Threats

S. E. Galaitsi <sup>(1)</sup>, <sup>1</sup> Jeffrey M. Keisler <sup>(1)</sup>, <sup>2</sup> Benjamin D. Trump <sup>(1)</sup>, <sup>1</sup> and Igor Linkov <sup>(1)</sup>, <sup>1</sup>

#### Field of Supply Chain Resilience is New

#### **Web of Science Publications**





#### The case for value chain resilience

2020

Management Research Review
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DOI 10.1108/MRR-08-2019-0353

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